

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

KNOW THE ENEMY: EXPANDED USE OF LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL
PROFILE DATA IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.


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05 February 2001

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

20010510 174

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): KNOW THE ENEMY: EXPANDED USE OF LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL PROFILE DATA IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING (UNCLASSIFIED)			
9. Personal Authors: Lieutenant Commander Bruce O. Lankford, USN			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 05 FEB 01	
12. Page Count: 32 12A Paper Advisor (if any): Dr. Elizabeth A. McIntyre, Ph.D.			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Operational Planning, Profile, Psychological, Cultural, Enemy Leadership, Center of Gravity, Course of Action, Operational Functions, Deception, Information Operations			
15. Abstract: The better one understands an enemy—especially how he thinks—the more effectively one can deter him from aggression or defeat him in armed conflict. The Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency produce analytical and psychological products that profile cultures and individuals. Profile data is not, however, readily available to operational planners or widely used in planning. Profile information on enemy cultures, civilian leaders, and military commanders should be fully incorporated into operational planning. This would assist commanders and planners in determining an enemy's center of gravity (COG), and would aid in development of a course of action (COA) that would leverage friendly assets against that COG and protect the friendly COG. Utilizing profile information, planners could formulate a more effective COA by optimizing the operational functions of command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and protection. Implementation of this concept should include employing on-site psychological and cultural expertise, educating operational planners on the application of profile data, and improving access to this information for planners.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

Abstract

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The better one understands an enemy—especially how he thinks—the more effectively one can deter him from aggression or defeat him in armed conflict. The Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency produce analytical and psychological products that profile cultures and individuals. Profile data is not, however, readily available to operational planners or widely used in planning.

Profile information on enemy cultures, civilian leaders, and military commanders should be fully incorporated into operational planning. This would assist commanders and planners in determining an enemy's center of gravity (COG), and would aid in development of a course of action (COA) that would leverage friendly assets against that COG and protect the friendly COG. Utilizing profile information, planners could formulate a more effective COA by optimizing the operational functions of command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and protection.

Implementation of this concept should include employing on-site psychological and cultural expertise, educating operational planners on the application of profile data, and improving access to this information for planners.

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Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.¹
Sun Tzu

Introduction

Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese master of warfare, expounded the importance of understanding an enemy more than 2000 years ago, yet his advice still applies to warfare in the twenty-first century. The better one understands an enemy—especially how he thinks—the more effectively one can deter him from aggression or defeat him in armed conflict. Sun Tzu did not use a formal scientific method to evaluate his enemy, but he considered it crucial to discern how his enemy reasoned in order to triumph with minimum bloodshed.

Today, the intelligence community utilizes many analytical and psychological methods to produce a variety of products that profile both individuals and entire cultures. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produces biographic reports on major civilian leaders worldwide, psychological studies on selected leaders, country profiles, and other specialized reports on people and cultures. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) generates military leadership profiles and culture studies. For the purposes of this paper, this data is referred to collectively as “profile information” or “profile data.” This information is used to support psychological operations (PSYOP), and has been for many years. Profile data is not, however, readily available to operational planners or widely used in their planning.

Profile information on enemy cultures, civilian leaders, and military commanders should be fully incorporated into operational planning. Incorporating this data into planning from start to finish would greatly assist commanders and planners in determining an enemy’s center of gravity (COG) for any given objective. It would also aid in the development of a course of action (COA) that would leverage friendly assets against that COG and protect the friendly COG. Utilizing profile data, planners could formulate a more effective COA by

optimizing the operational functions of command and control (C2), intelligence, movement and maneuver, and protection. Implementation of this concept should include employing on-site psychological and cultural expertise, educating operational planners on the application of profile data, and improving access to this information for planners. By implementing this concept, operational commanders could significantly improve their ability to effectively employ limited assets to achieve their objective.

An Extreme Case in Point

The U.S. Civil War provided some particularly clear examples of how a commander's understanding (or lack thereof) of his enemy's thought process led to unprecedented success or failure. Confederate General Robert E. Lee was well known for his skill as an operational commander. One of his greatest assets was the ability to size up opposing commanders and form battle plans that capitalized on this understanding. Personally acquainted with many of the Union commanders, he often took tremendous calculated risks based on his estimation of their personalities and what action they would therefore take. His bold actions frequently enabled him to prevail against larger forces.

Good illustrations of how Lee acted boldly upon his estimations of enemy thought processes were the times he divided his forces in the presence of a larger enemy. On several occasions, he split his forces to execute bold flanking maneuvers or concurrent operations, knowing that he could safely sacrifice the principle of mass because the enemy commander would be too hesitant to act. At the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee sized up Union General Joseph Hooker quite well. Sensing Hooker was mentally whipped, Lee decided to take the offensive even though he was outnumbered almost two to one.² Knowing Hooker would be inactive, he directed a daring flanking scheme that led to a decisive victory. When Lee divided his forces against Union General George McClellan during the Maryland Campaign,

one of Lee's officers questioned the COA. Lee promptly replied, "Are you acquainted with General McClellan?...He is an able general but a very cautious one."³ Lee was right on the mark. Although McClellan possessed a captured copy of Lee's battle plans for the campaign, he was timid in acting upon them and lost the chance to crush Lee's divided forces. Instead, he fought Lee inconclusively at Antietam after Lee concentrated his forces again.

Many northern generals, on the other hand, made very poor assessments of Lee's personality and decision-making. Hooker believed Lee would retreat at Chancellorsville.⁴ McClellan described Lee as "too cautious and weak under grave responsibility....likely to be timid and irresolute in action."⁵ McClellan had characterized himself, but certainly not Lee. Northern forces paid dearly for their generals' inept assessments of Lee's tendencies.

As the Civil War examples demonstrate, understanding how an enemy thinks enables a commander to leverage his forces to great advantage. This example is an extreme one, in that many Civil War generals were personally acquainted with their enemy counterparts. It does, however, provide great testimony to the conceptual validity and importance of knowing how an enemy reasons. Given modern analytical and psychological methodologies, similar results are attainable if sufficient data is available on an enemy culture and its leaders, and if this data is properly analyzed and applied to the operational planning process.

Road Map

Several steps will be employed to demonstrate the validity and importance of the thesis. First, the applicability of profile information to COG determination will be examined. Next, enhancement of COA formulation will be explored by applying this data to several of the operational functions. To avoid classification issues, historical examples from World War II (WW II) will be used as illustrations of where profile information typical of that era was helpful in operational planning or where it could have made a significant positive

difference if it *had* been utilized. Following the discussion of operational functions, recommendations for concept implementation will be presented. Finally, counter-arguments concerning the concept and recommendations will be addressed. Appendix A provides background data on the abilities of intelligence analysts and psychologists to construct profiles of enemy cultures and leadership. Appendix B contains sample country profile data. Appendix C is the template for a DIA Military Leadership Profile. The author recommends perusing these appendices before reading the balance of the paper.

Determining the Enemy Center of Gravity

Regardless of the level of conflict, the single most important task for planners is to correctly identify the enemy's COG for the given objective. Profile data on the enemy can greatly facilitate this task. By understanding how enemy personnel think in general, planners can more accurately determine what the enemy values and what motivates him to fight. Data focused on how their civilian and military leaders reason is particularly valuable. Knowledge of this type can greatly assist a friendly commander in deducing what an enemy commander thinks *his own* strengths and weaknesses are and which of those strengths *he* thinks he *must have* to prosecute the conflict—his COG. From there the friendly commander can determine the actions required to destroy or neutralize that COG and thereby persuade the enemy to conform to friendly objectives.

An enemy's COG is probably not the same as what the friendly commander's COG would be if the situation were reversed. It is absolutely essential for friendly planners to look at the situation *from the enemy's perspective*. Looking at physical aspects (space, time, and force) is not enough; everything must be filtered through the enemy's beliefs, attitudes, fears, and motivations. To do this, planners must use profile data throughout the planning process, with professional analysts and psychologists to assist in interpreting that information.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf in WW II provided a good illustration of how better understanding of an enemy's thought processes could have prevented misidentification of his operational COG. During the operation, Admiral William Halsey (Commander, U.S. THIRD Fleet) was tasked to protect U.S. amphibious transport shipping against enemy attacks from the north. He had two Japanese naval forces to contend with: Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's heavy surface force and Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's fast carrier force. Kurita's was the only force capable of decisive combat action, because most Japanese carrier pilots had been lost in combat and the training pipeline was unable to produce nearly enough qualified replacement pilots for action at Leyte.

Despite a lack of pilots, the Japanese sent the carriers themselves into action to serve as bait to lure Halsey out of position (knowing full well that their entire force would probably be destroyed). This would enable Kurita to slip past Halsey from the San Bernadino Straight and destroy the amphibious landing ships at Leyte Gulf, which was the Japanese operational objective. Halsey, a naval aviator, viewed carrier forces as the operational COG for both belligerents. He also did not understand his enemy's reasoning process as well as he should have, tending to evaluate situations from his perspective only. Given this, it did not even occur to him that the Japanese would use their carriers as a sacrificial decoy force, since *he* would never have considered such an option. The Japanese had no such reservation about their carrier forces for two reasons. First, the carriers were not an effective fighting force without pilots and airplanes onboard. Secondly, their warrior's code viewed such a suicidal mission, designed to achieve a crucial goal in the defense of the emperor, as an extremely honorable way to die. They were quite willing to sacrifice those ships and their crews for the collective good. Americans, on the other hand, maintained very different views about the

sanctity of life and would probably never have ordered such a mass suicide mission, even if their carrier forces *were* hollow.

The tremendous differences between Japanese and American perspectives, Halsey's inadequate understanding of his enemy, and his determination to win a decisive carrier battle prevented him from correctly identifying the Japanese COG. Although U.S. intelligence underestimated the severity of the Japanese pilot training problem, there had been a marked decrease in their pilot proficiency. As Vego notes in On Operational Art, "it seems clear that Admiral Halsey did not sufficiently account for the declining performance of Japanese pilots after the Battle of Midway."⁶ Two other aspects that should have piqued Halsey's curiosity were timing and operational security. If the Japanese carriers *were* a credible force, why did they not attack Halsey's carrier force, or draw it away, before the Japanese surface force (which was more vulnerable to air attack) arrived? Why did the Japanese carriers sacrifice the initiative by using poor radio procedures, thereby broadcasting their position to Halsey? While one can certainly envision a COA (other than pure deception) that might have required the Japanese to act as they did, the important point is that these indicators should have given Halsey pause. It seems apparent that his belief that the enemy COG *had* to be their carriers prevented him from even considering the possibility of deception. Had he understood the Japanese and their logic, *and looked at the situation from their perspective*, he might well have realized the carriers were an empty feint intended to deceive him.

By incorrectly assuming the Japanese COG was their carrier force, Halsey allowed himself to be deceived and sailed north to engage Ozawa's force. This left the amphibious shipping at Leyte Gulf vulnerable to Japanese attack. Kurita steamed through San Bernadino Straight, and would have decimated the amphibious force had he not become confused by the

fog of war and retired from the engagement. Thus, if Halsey had better understood Japanese leadership and correctly identified their operational COG, he would have had the opportunity to defeat Kurita's force without leaving the operation's northern flank exposed.

Formulating a Course of Action

Once an enemy's COG has been determined, cultural and leadership profile data can be used to formulate a COA that is optimized to achieve the desired end state. Operational planners can employ this information to help them leverage friendly forces against the enemy COG (by exploiting vulnerabilities or seams in the enemy structure), and also to protect the friendly COG. Specifically, profile data can enable planners to improve the operational functions of C2, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and protection.

Operational Command and Control

Profile data on an enemy's culture and leaders can assist planners in improving the operational function of C2 in several ways; most are subsets of Information Operations (IO). Though IO spans more than just C2, it will be addressed here since it is more closely linked to C2 than other functions. Two of the most promising means for employing this data are in exploiting the enemy's Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop and in individually targeting IO against a leader and his confidants. As previously mentioned, this information is already used regularly in PSYOP against enemy forces; hence, arguments for inclusion of profile data in PSYOP are unnecessary. Suffice it to say that PSYOP allows the friendly commander to "multiply the effects of deception, reinforce apparent perceptions, plant seeds of doubt about the enemy leadership,...and to magnify one's own superiority."⁷

The "decide" portion of a commander's OODA Loop is the part most vulnerable to targeting using profile information. Individual profile data can tell planners if a leader makes decisions quickly or slowly, with scant or large quantities of data, and with the help of others

or by himself. Each of these tendencies can be exploited. For example, a commander who requires large amounts of time and data to make decisions can be kept out of his “information comfort zone.” Limiting the information he receives—or providing conflicting reports—will expand the decision-making timeline and hence the OODA Loop. The ability to slow an enemy’s reaction process is an obvious asset to a friendly commander.

The information age provides increased opportunities to target specific leaders and their advisors with “precision guided” IO/PSYOP.⁸ Profile data is absolutely essential for this to be effective. This is true for two reasons. First, the exact choice of words, graphics, and sounds will dramatically impact effectiveness. For example, to maximize the effect of an electronic message to a certain individual, word choice must not only be appropriate for his language and culture—it must also be tailored to his specific personality. Second, profile data often identifies confidants of a leader and their relative influence over him. IO targeted at advisors can be used to influence a leader indirectly. Once again, profile information on the advisors is required to successfully exploit their influence over that leader.

Operational Intelligence

“While not neglecting the purely physical elements of the situation, operational intelligence should focus on such imponderable factors as the personality, character, and intentions of the enemy operational commanders, service/joint doctrine, morale and discipline, and quality of training of the enemy forces.”⁹ Ostensibly, doctrine agrees with this focus on the enemy commander. Joint Publication 2-01.3 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace) states, “Psychological profiles on military and political leaders may facilitate understanding an adversary’s behavior, evaluating an adversary’s vulnerability to deception, and assessing the relative probability of an adversary adopting various COAs.”¹⁰ Despite this endorsement, joint

intelligence activities fail to adequately employ profile data in support of operational planning, focusing instead on hardware capabilities and force dispositions.

The single most important use of profile information in operational intelligence is in determining the enemy's COG, as already discussed. Operational intelligence must also use profile data to enhance other operational functions. This information can assist in protecting the friendly COG by guiding the planning for deception and surprise, and perhaps also by unmasking enemy deception. Profile data can often tell planners whom an enemy leader trusts most in his circle of advisors. If the head of one intelligence organ is part of the inner circle, and the head of another is in disfavor, the leader will likely place more emphasis on data from the first outfit. This insight can be combined with intelligence on methods used by that organization, leading to useful guidance on how counter-intelligence should be conducted. It can also be used to maximize the effects of deceptive information on the enemy leader; "input" to the collection process of the favored organ can be tailored to the director's personality, who will then influence the leader in some manner.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a superb example of how poor understanding of an enemy's thought process can negate the usefulness of physical intelligence. This infamous Japanese victory should not have been a surprise to the American operational commanders. Americans repeatedly ignored indications of the impending attack, since they were convinced that events would unfold differently. "There was a clear and gross underestimation of the Japanese ability and willingness to execute such an attack, and also of their taking the risk to do so."¹¹ Clearly, U.S. commanders did not understand the potential adversary whom they had ostensibly been planning to fight for years.

Operational Movement and Maneuver / Operational Protection

Employment of profile data in planning for the functions of operational movement and maneuver and operational protection will be discussed together. The reason for this is that the primary applicability of this data to both functions is in operational deception and surprise. Most deception plans require maneuver of forces to give credibility to the intended deception. Likewise, surprise operations almost always involve maneuver of forces. Thus, both deception and surprise are directly linked to operational movement and maneuver. Any deception or surprise also serves the function of operational protection; both leverage one's own forces in a manner that reduces friendly casualties and protects the friendly COG.

Profile data can make the difference between success and failure for a deception or surprise plan, since it is important to provide a presentation that will elicit a certain response (inaction or inappropriate maneuver, for example) from the enemy commander. To do this, the deception must reinforce the enemy's current perceptions or be believable and verifiable enough that it modifies those perceptions subtly, without jarring his view and sparking undue suspicion in his mind. Profile information is essential to creation of high fidelity deception. While an enemy might be deceived by plans that do not account for culture and individual leadership traits, there is a greater chance he will believe the deception if the information he receives is tailored to his personality (and thus seems natural to him). This means action should play on his fears, motivations, and/or goals, and supporting features like precision IO should use the words, sounds, and graphics which are most likely to influence him (or his advisors, when using indirect IO).

A superb example of using psychological data to plan operational deception was provided by the Leyte Gulf example cited earlier:

Japanese operational planners put considerable emphasis on studying psychological traits of the opposing commanders. Hence, they had high hopes in the success of their deception plan [Ozawa's relatively impotent carrier force dangled as bait to lure the American carriers out of position] because of [Admiral Halsey's] well-known propensity to act rashly and aggressively.¹²

The Japanese also knew (as did everyone else) that Halsey was almost totally focused on carrier warfare. Using empty carriers as bait was the perfect plan to deceive Halsey, since it would never have occurred to him that someone would sacrifice their carriers to protect battleships, and because he did not understand his enemy's willingness to sacrifice anything in defense of the emperor.

The attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated how knowledge of an enemy could assist in planning surprise operations. The Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto spent a great deal of time in the United States, and was therefore quite familiar with American culture. Thus, he had observed two things first-hand that were useful in planning the attack: the isolationistic attitudes of the population and lazy Sunday mornings. He knew that isolationism would cause complacency in the defense institutions and that the Americans would have their guard down (more than usual) early on a Sunday morning. He could not have been more right.

Recommendations

It is apparent by this point that the use of enemy profile information in operational planning is extremely important, as this data can be quite helpful in identifying the enemy's COG and in formulating a COA optimized to achieve the desired end state. How should the U.S. military implement this concept? Institutionalized use of profile data in operational planning is needed to derive maximum benefit from available products. Recommendations include: adding a psychologist to all regional commander-in-chief (CINC) staffs, providing a psychologist and cultural expertise for joint task force (JTF) staffs, training planners on the

importance and use of profile data, and improving access to this data for planners, including a user-friendly system for obtaining new profile information.

Psychological and Cultural Expertise

A cognitive or social psychologist, in that order of preference, should be added permanently to all regional CINC staffs. These psychologists must be familiar with the cultures in their region, and confer regularly with CIA and DIA psychologists and analysts responsible for profiling the cultures and leaders in that region. A dedicated psychologist could counsel the CINC on psychological matters pertaining to an enemy, assisting him in assessing enemy reasoning and intent. He would be available to assist in every phase of operational planning, by interpreting profile data for planners and by providing a "reality check" for proposed COAs. He could also identify requirements for updated or new profile information from the CIA and DIA, and perform limited on-site psychological analysis of enemy commanders and forces when required. Finally, he could work with the PSYOP community to ensure that PSYOP was fully integrated into operational plans.

The commander of a JTF (CJTF) also needs psychological and cultural expertise on his planning staff. If possible, a regionally oriented psychologist should be provided to the CJTF via his National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). If a psychologist is not available for the NIST, the CINC psychologist might be able to join the CJTF at CINC discretion. Specific cultural expertise is also necessary. An analyst who specializes in the subject area, culture, and leaders should be included on the NIST. If the CJTF is not provided an analyst, he should make use of video teleconferencing (VTC) capabilities to consult CIA and DIA analysts. He can also gain valuable information from ambassadors, station chiefs, attaches, and others with in-depth cultural knowledge. In some cases, it may be advisable and possible

to interview members of the local populace or cultural expatriates. The staff psychologist should conduct these interviews, if possible.

Education for Planners

Operational planners should be trained to employ profile information in all stages of deliberate and crisis planning. In other words, profile data should be incorporated into each step of the commander's estimate of the situation process and the subsequent development of operation plans and orders. To facilitate this incorporation, joint doctrine should be changed to reflect application of profile data to the planning process. In particular, Joint Publications 2-0, 2-01, 2-01.2, 3-0, 5-0, 5-00.1, and 5-00.2 should be revised appropriately. Also, all war colleges and planning courses should include use of profile data in their syllabi.

Improved Access

In order to employ profile data in planning, it must be made more accessible to the planners themselves. This information cannot remain locked up in the joint intelligence center or in the intelligence directorate of the staff, where the people who require it to plan effectively cannot access it regularly. Planners from both the plans and policy (J5) and the operations (J3) directorates must have access to applicable profiles. In addition, there must be a customer-friendly system in place for operational planners to request new profiles and updates to existing ones when necessary.

Alternate Positions

Several counter-arguments against this paper's thesis and recommendations must be addressed. These arguments include unclear applicability to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), use of IO alone to incorporate profile data into operational planning, use of VTC capability for psychologist support, security concerns, and the imponderable nature of the entire concept.

Applicability to MOOTW

One might challenge this paper's thesis and recommendations by questioning the applicability of the concept to MOOTW, since all of the examples so far have been from "hot wars." Does any of this apply to MOOTW, which are our staple missions these days? Yes, without a doubt. "It is well known that every military action, or absence of one, produces psychological effects regardless of...intentions."¹³ In fact, profile data may be even *more* useful in MOOTW than in full-scale combat, since the mission is usually to stabilize or de-escalate a situation. Keeping diplomatic channels open and productive is a high priority, so an operational commander cannot make up for a lack of knowledge about the other players by simply employing greater firepower.

In MOOTW, more personal interface with the various players from other countries is usually involved. In order to achieve mission objectives effectively, commanders and their planners must understand how regional players will perceive and react to U.S. actions. U.S. commanders cannot afford to mirror-image other leaders. Different players will have unique regional perspectives that will affect the manner in which they perceive events and may lead to unanticipated reactions.¹⁴ The less one knows about how the other players think, the more likely he is to provoke undesirable reactions, thereby impeding or perhaps even failing in the mission. Hence, profile information is crucial to success in MOOTW.

Incorporation into Information Operations Alone

One could argue that IO has a breadth that takes in all of the operational functions, therefore incorporation of profile data into IO planning will effectively allow commanders to reap the benefits of this information without implementing this paper's recommendations. United States Central Command (CENTCOM), having learned many valuable lessons from Operation DESERT STORM, has initiated such a program to enhance their planning process.

The staff utilizes profile information in planning IO, a process in which all of the directorates are represented. They subsequently simulate their plans at the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) with psychological experts available to provide feedback on the plan.¹⁵

CENTCOM's process is a giant step in the right direction. It is not, however, the complete answer to the problem. Although IO is quite pervasive in modern warfare, the only way to realize the maximum benefit from the use of profile information is to make it integral to COG determination and planning as discussed. IO is a major part of this, but it does not encompass *all* applications for profile data. In addition, the CENTCOM approach does not have the advantage of on-site psychological expertise. IO is an excellent start, but it is the equivalent of getting to second base—the whole program is required to hit a home run.

The VTC Alternative

The advent of reliable VTC capability might tempt one to argue that CINCs and CJTFs do not need a dedicated psychologist on their staff, since another member would cost too much and advice is just a VTC away. Collaborative planning is done via VTC, so why add a billet to the staff? The answers to that question are synergy and availability. First, there is no substitute for having people plan together in the same location. The ability to coordinate quickly and continuously between planning cells provides a synergy that cannot be matched by holding the psychology questions until the afternoon VTC. The psychologist can be present during brainstorming sessions, confer with the CINC and his directors on a regular basis, and move rapidly from one cell to the next. These advantages have inestimable value. It will not be the same if the psychologist is there only in cyberspace.

Security Concerns

Security concerns are another argument against using profile data in operational planning. It is generally accepted that the more people that have access to sensitive data, the

greater chance that data, methods, or capabilities will be compromised. This paper does not deny that maxim. It is important, however, to remember the primacy of the mission. If information required to efficiently achieve a given end state is withheld from planners, the COA will not be optimized for the adversary. If that is the case, friendly forces in the field may pay a higher price than necessary or the desired end state may not be achieved. One must also bear in mind that the planners to whom this information would be released will be career service members with appropriate clearances—the chances of a security incident are still quite low. Success is more important than rigid control of useful data.

Imponderability

The final counter is the “Baah, humbug” argument. A CINC or CJTF, having spent many years in a very tangible military service, tends to be an individual who likes concrete facts. The imponderability of profile information makes it difficult for many commanders to trust. Why should a leader put the lives of his troops at risk based on “feelings”? Because those feelings, attitudes, and biases are what make all people—enemy or ally—tick. It is possible to determine very useful information through cultural and individual analysis, and that data gives a commander tremendous leverage against his adversary. Leaders must often follow their instincts or “feelings” when making time-critical decisions, so it actually makes a lot of sense to understand what is happening in the other commander’s head. Education on the capabilities of modern analysis and a review of Robert E. Lee’s operational successes should convince even the strongest skeptic.

Conclusion

In an era of uncertain threat environments, general global instability, and a military that is highly tasked but not highly funded, operational commanders must be able to leverage their forces to the greatest advantage. Also, current missions may require politically delicate

operations that must subtly lead an adversary to behave in a certain manner. For both fiscal and political reasons, then, CINCs and CJTFs usually do not have the option of steam rolling adversaries with tremendous force. This requires their COAs for both conventional war and MOOTW to fully exploit enemy vulnerabilities in order to make efficient use of limited forces, adroitly manipulate the adversary, or both.

Thorough knowledge of an adversary greatly facilitates exploitation of his vulnerabilities, regardless of whether the mission is full-scale combat or peace keeping. Understanding the other party's attitudes, perceptions, motivations, and decision-making style allows a commander to more accurately identify his adversary's COG and to formulate better operational plans to destroy or neutralize that COG. Profile data on enemy cultures, civilian leaders, and military commanders provides friendly commanders these invaluable insights. Unfortunately, planners do not currently have regular access to profile data and are not trained to incorporate this insight into operational plans.

The U.S. military must institutionalize the use of profile information throughout the operational planning process. This data must be available to the operational planners in J3 and J5, and they must be educated in its value and applicability. CINCs and CJTFs need a staff psychologist to interpret profile data, participate in all stages of planning, and advise the commander on psychological matters. Additionally, CJTFs should receive a culture specific analyst with their NIST. Finally, operational commanders and their staffs must always force themselves to look at any situation *through the eyes of their adversary*. When they master that art, they should be able to accurately identify an enemy's COG, and subsequently formulate a COA that is optimized to achieve the desired end state.

Appendix A: Overview of Analytical and Psychological Concepts

Purpose

The intelligence community employs many different types of analysis to generate cultural and individual profile information. Familiarity with the concepts involved gives the reader a better appreciation for the capabilities of modern analysis, and thence the benefits of utilizing profile data in operational planning. This appendix provides an overview of these concepts that will aid the reader in assessing the paper's thesis and recommendations.

The Dilemma

"People in different parts of the world look different and behave differently, and, according to most psychologists who have made such studies, they think and even perceive differently."¹⁶ Unfortunately for planners, however, the normal human tendency is to assume that other people will think similarly to oneself. Psychologists call this tendency "assumed-similarity bias,"¹⁷ what military planners usually term "mirror-imaging." Given that people reason differently, but tend to believe that others think the way they do, it is easy to see that operational planners can misjudge how an enemy will behave and subsequently choose a course of action (COA) that may not achieve the desired end state.

The Solution

To overcome the natural tendency to "mirror-image" when planning operations, it is necessary to do two things. First, one must acknowledge the tendency and consciously avoid it. Second, one must incorporate professionally produced and interpreted information about cultural beliefs and attitudes of the enemy population, and profile data on enemy leaders in particular, into the planning process. Keeping this knowledge central to planning will assist in determining the likelihood of various enemy COAs, evaluating friendly COAs from the enemy's perspective, and surmising possible enemy reactions to friendly actions. Profile

information is essential to optimizing plans. As Vego notes in On Operational Art, “penetrating the mind of the enemy operational commander...is perhaps the single most important element for success at the operational level.”¹⁸

The Basic Disciplines

Specialized intelligence analysts and psychologists use a variety of methodologies to create profiles on cultures and individual leaders. Intelligence analysts blend both public and classified information from many sources to generate profile reports. Psychologists start with the information used by the intelligence analysts, and add other types of data that have psychological relevance. They apply a fusion of psychological theories to the data to draw conclusions about cultures and specific civilian and military leaders. Both of these disciplines are examined below.

Intelligence Analysis

Rapid global travel and communication, the prevalence of international commerce and interchange, and the Internet have made a great deal of information available about other nations and their respective cultures. Understanding an enemy culture is crucial, since it is “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group from another.”¹⁹ Cultural anthropology studies, knowledge of enemy languages and history, and other types of background data enable analysts to determine, *in general*, how a member of an enemy culture perceives the world and others, their motivations, values, and fears, and a little about how they reason. A cultural profile generated from analysis of this information can be very useful in dealing with an adversary directly and in planning for Information Operations (IO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Electronic Warfare (EW). Appendix B shows the types of information that can be included in a detailed country profile. An actual profile can be quite long, and contains a plethora of data about the subject country. Particularly

useful data is that which pertains to cultural biases, ethnic groups, relations between ethnic groups, religions, languages, literacy, government relationships with the people and military, economics, transnational issues, and military demographics.

Analysts can also formulate many conclusions about specific individuals. Search engines on the Internet can locate items written by or about an individual, from which an accurate picture of a person's attitudes, interests, needs, and weaknesses may be created.²⁰ Personnel from the State Department and other agencies report findings from their personal contact with and observation of key individuals, as well as secondary information about those individuals' peer reputations, temperament, working and personal relationships, and political views. Fusion of cultural and individual data can yield profiles of both civilian and military leaders that will assist a friendly commander in understanding that leader's basic outlook, experience, capability, influence, and leadership style. This insight, in turn, can be exploited to optimize operational plans, particularly those for individually targeted PSYOP, deception, and surprise. Appendix C contains a sample military leadership profile template. Profiles can be as short as one page (for a leader about whom little is known) or many pages for well-documented individuals.

Psychological Analysis

If sufficient data is available on specific cultures and individuals, psychologists can further refine products of the intelligence analysis previously described. Two branches of psychology are directly relevant to better understanding an enemy: cognitive psychology and social psychology. Cognitive psychology is the study of the higher mental processes which humans use to "understand the world, process information, make judgments and decisions, and communicate knowledge to others."²¹ Therefore, the products of cognitive analysis can help an operational commander understand how an enemy reasons. Social psychology

examines “how people’s thoughts, feelings, and actions are affected by others,”²² facilitating analysis of how culturally distinct attitudes and biases affect enemy thought processes. In addition to utilizing data from the intelligence analysis process, then, psychologists can glean excellent information by applying theories used in psychological testing and cultural studies. While comprehensive testing cannot be performed without the presence and consent of an individual, data based on past behavior, testing theory, and various studies may be fused to generate meaningful conclusions.²³

Psychological culture studies furnish significant data on enemy populations and provide a foundation upon which to build profiles of specific enemy leaders. An example of such a project is Hofstede’s study of 50 national cultures. Using four separate dimensions of culture-related values, such as a population’s tendency toward individualism or collectivism, his study ranks the cultures on a relative scale.²⁴ Psychologists can use this scale to identify the values and tendencies of an enemy’s culture at a macro level, and how they compare with those of other cultures. This data can be employed in two fundamental ways. First, it can be used to support IO, PSYOP, and EW, as with other cultural analysis products. Second, it gives psychologists a logical basis from which to begin analysis of an individual leader. This basis is crucial, since individuals *learn* most attitudes from their culture.²⁵

Profiling individual leaders obviously requires more specific information than the cultural norms; psychological testing theory picks up where the previous analysis methods culminate. For instance, the field of Neuro-Linguistic Programming enables psychologists to determine some of an enemy leader’s cognitive tendencies from his words, eye movements, and other cues when he is speaking.²⁶ From this analysis they can deduce the individual’s lead sensory system—the system which that person unconsciously uses to perform a majority

of his cognitive functions. This means, for example, that a “visual” person will recall a memory by “seeing” it. This provides important insight into how to influence that leader through written and verbal communications, IO/PSYOP, deception, surprise, and threat presentation. IO targeted at that leader might use a word that translates as “see” rather than one that means “understand.” Likewise, deception or deterrence plans will be more effective in directing the enemy leader’s response if he is presented with a strong visual cue.

Analyzing a leader using Myers-Briggs Personality Types can indicate whether that leader is inner-directed, or if he focuses on the situation and other people in his reasoning process. From this a psychologist can determine if the leader makes decisions without input from others, or if he seeks counsel from advisors before making decisions.²⁷ An operational commander can exploit both of these tendencies. The inner-directed leader can be denied information. The leader who seeks advice can be misled by feeding disinformation or even conflicting information to his confidants. This gives the friendly commander the ability to delay or disrupt the enemy’s decision-making process—always a valuable capability.

Psychological testing techniques and other analysis tools can be used to create parts of a puzzle, which can be pieced together to form a coherent picture.²⁸ Data produced by this psychological analysis process can be merged with information from other analysis methods, enabling psychologists to form an accurate profile of that individual. An important part of this fusion analysis is determining if an enemy leader has a secondary leadership style that emerges in a crisis. Knowledge of past behavior in stressful situations is required to ascertain the existence and nature of a secondary leadership style. With a reasonable amount of data, then, the discipline of psychology can provide useful insight into an enemy leader’s thought processes and how he is likely to perceive events, make decisions, and react to stress.

Limitations

A caveat is in order at this point: use of profile data in operational planning is not a panacea. Cultural and individual analysis is not an exact science. Neither is psychology—it is a social science with inherent variability and room for interpretation. Therefore, behavior prediction is very difficult. An analyst or psychologist will probably not be able to tell an operational commander *exactly* what an enemy commander will do in a particular situation. Hence, one should never discount an enemy capability because one does not think the enemy leader will execute a certain COA.²⁹ It is possible, however, to determine many individual tendencies which can be used to support operational planning. For instance, psychologists can determine if an enemy commander is likely to select a COA quickly (with very scant information), or if he will require large amounts of time and information to make a decision. A friendly commander can exploit this information to plan a surprise attack or deception. He can employ the approach of slipping a small but important detail past the impulsive decision-maker. Conversely, he can overwhelm the thoughtful one with data (of any type) or prevent him from reaching his “information comfort zone” by feeding him too little data.

Final Note

Having tempered the reader's expectations, one last point is germane. In general, an individual's personality is unlikely to change significantly in his adult life. Given this, past behavior is extremely helpful in postulating what individuals will do in the future. Hence, the more data that is available about an enemy commander, especially information regarding how he has behaved in similar situations in the past, the more accurately psychologists and analysts can forecast future behavior.³⁰

Appendix B: Cultural Profile Data

Purpose

This appendix contains a notional listing of topics that may be found in a cultural profile. The list of topics is by no means exhaustive; it is simply meant to show the reader a representation of the data fields that can be useful in understanding the enemy.

Notional Data Fields

Culture in General

- Languages
- Customs
- Values
- Status of women
- Views of outsiders/U.S.

Ethnic Information

- Groups
- Group backgrounds/history
- Group internal issues
- Dominant groups
- Ethnic dispersion
- Ethnic/profession relationships
- Relations between groups

Religion

- Sects
- Religion/ethnic relationships
- Basic and unusual beliefs
- Religious leadership and influence

Government

- System/ideology
- Pending changes/instability
- Government relationships with the people and military
- Human rights record
- Transnational issues

Economy

- GDP per capita
- Poverty levels
- Status of work force

Education

- Literacy rate
- Emphasis on education

Military Demographics

COUNTRY
NAME
DATE

Appendix C

Military Leadership Profile



CLASSIFICATION



(Classification) *NAME:*

Purpose: Show the reader the types of information that may be found in an individual leadership profile. The fields listed below are not exhaustive—they merely represent nominal data.

(Classification) *POSITION:*

- Self-explanatory

(Classification) *SIGNIFICANCE:*

- Individual's influence in his particular institution
- Individual's influence with national leadership (inner/outer circle, etc.)
- Personal alliances/mentors

(U) Photo date: YEAR

(U) COPYRIGHT WARNING: Further dissemination of the photograph in this publication is not authorized.

(Classification) *POLITICS:*

- Political views (rivalries, alliances, disputes)
- Party membership (station, regime connections, aspirations)
- Relationship to ruling party (loyal/maverick)

(Classification) *PERSONAL DATA:*

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| - Family data (immediate/extended, family man?) | - Religious practices |
| - Hobbies (solitary or team oriented?) | - Languages spoken |
| - Habits (drink, smoke, adultery?) | - Ethnic background |
| - Command style (authoritarian/team builder) | - Temperament |
| - Personality traits (humor, introvert/extrovert, etc.) | - Schooling |

(Classification) *CAREER:*

- Experience (command, instructor, billets, years, etc.)
- Combat experience/performance
- Key judgments
- Professional schooling
- Expected future progression

(U) Questions and comments may be addressed to DIA/(Office), (202) 123-4567.

Note: This is an example of a profile generated solely from analysis. Psychological reports can have much more detailed information.

This product responds to the Office of the Secretary of Defense's production requirement A001-96-0004.

Derived from:
Declassify on:

Notes

¹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963; New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84.

² James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (London: Oxford University Press, 1988; New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 640.

³ John G. Walker, "Jackson's Capture of Harper's Ferry," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (New York: Century, 1888), 605-606.

⁴ McPherson, 639-640.

⁵ Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. I, Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Random House, 1958), 465.

⁶ Milan N. Vego, On Operational Art, 4th draft (Newport, RI: Naval War College, September 1999), 229.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 277.

⁸ Christopher M. Centner, "Precision-Guided Propaganda: Exploiting the U.S. Information Advantage in Peacetime," Strategic Review, Spring 1997, 38.

⁹ Vego, On Operational Art, 286.

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Pub 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: 24 May 2000), II-39.

¹¹ Vego, On Operational Art, 285.

¹² Milan N. Vego, "Operational Aspects of the Sho-1 Plan," The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings, comp. Milan N. Vego (Newport, RI: Naval War College, September 1997), 3 (226 of compilation).

¹³ Philip S. Yang, Psychological Strategies for Low-Intensity Conflict, CLIC Papers (Langley, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, October 1988), 26.

¹⁴ U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Political-Military Analysis Handbook, 2d ed., rev. (Fort Bragg, NC: August 1990), 11-1.

¹⁵ Rodney S. Fitzpatrick, COL, USAF, and Deputy Chief, Operations Plans Division (CCJ3P), U.S. Central Command, interview by author, 4 January 2001, telephone conference, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

¹⁶ B. M. Foss, foreword to Barbara B. Lloyd, Perception and Cognition: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972), 11.

¹⁷ Robert S. Feldman, Understanding Psychology, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 615.

¹⁸ Vego, On Operational Art, 453.

¹⁹ Peter B. Smith and Michael Harris Bond, Social Psychology Across Cultures: Analysis and Perspectives (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1993), 41, quoting G. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980), 21.

²⁰ Centner, 38.

²¹ Feldman, 255.

²² Ibid., 604.

²³ Mary Alice Gordon, Ph.D., Texas State Licensed/Certified Psychologist, and Associate Professor Emeritus, Southern Methodist University, interview by author, 28 January 2001, telephone conference, Middletown, RI.

²⁴ Smith and Bond, 38-43.

²⁵ Wilbur Schramm and others, The Nature of Psychological Warfare, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-214 (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, September 1953), 82.

²⁶ Gordon interview, 28 JAN 01.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Mary Alice Gordon, Ph.D., Texas State Licensed/Certified Psychologist, and Associate Professor Emeritus, Southern Methodist University, interview by author, 25 January 2001, telephone conference, Middletown, RI.

²⁹ Vego, On Operational Art, 285.

³⁰ Gordon interview, 25 JAN 01.

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